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Constitutional Law-THE INDIGENT MISDEMEAwANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL-
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
In accordance with the provisions of the federal and most state constitu-
tions,' a person accused of a crime has the right to be heard and to be as-
sisted by counsel in his defense. 2 However, not until 1932 was the right
to counsel for indigent criminal defendants recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States,3 and the extent of this right has remained unclear
for forty years.4
1 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932);
Re Newbern, 175 Cal. App. 2d 862, 1 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1959); Harrell v. Commonwealth,
328 S.W.2d 531 (Ky. 1959); People v. Thorn, 156 N.Y. 286, 50 NE. 947 (1898); Thomas
v. Mills, 117 Ohio St. 114, 157 N.E. 488 (1927); State ex rel. Tucker v. Davis, 9 Okla.
Crim. 94, 130 P. 962 (1913); Turner v. State, 91 Tex. Grim. 627, 241 S.W. 162 (1922);
Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 462, 136 N.W. 166 (1912). But see People v. Robinson, 222 Cal.
App. 2d 602, 35 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1963). The Court held that the right to be represented
by an attorney of one's choice does not give a defendant the right to insist on a par-
ticular attorney where this would unnecessarily impede or obstruct the proceedings. Id.
at-, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
2Under these provisions a defendant is entitled to have an attorney appointed by the
court to act in his behalf, or to be given a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his
own choice. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 US. 433 (1958); Chandler v. Fretag,
348 US. 3 (1954); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). This right is of a substan-
tial rather than a formal nature. The constitutional guarantees require the services of
a licensed attorney, not an attorney in fact or a layman. See, e.g., Johnson v. United
States, 110 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
3 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing for the
majority of the court, clearly stated the importance of the defendant's right to counsel
in a criminal proceeding:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel Even the intelligent and educated lay-
man has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime,
he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon in-
competent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 68.
4 The right to counsel was a source of much controversy during those forty years,
as is evidenced by the voluminous literature devoted to its discussion. See, e.g., BEANEY,
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERIcAN CouRTs (1955); Fellman, The Right to Counsel
under State Law, 30 Wis. L. REv. 281 (1955); Fellman, The Federal Right to Counsel
in State Courts, 31 NEB. L. REv. 15 (1951); Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel
in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. Rav. 559 (1951); Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel under
the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1944); Kamisal, Betts v. Brady Twenty
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In the recent case of Argersinger v. Hamlin,5 the indigent misdemeanant's
right to appointed counsel has received explicit recognition as a constitu-
tional right by the United States Supreme Court. Unrepresented by coun-
sel, Jon Richard Argersinger, an indigent, was tried and convicted in a
Florida court for carrying a concealed weapon, 6 an offense punishable by
imprisonment up to six months and a one thousand dollar fine.7 Habeas
corpus proceedings were instituted in the Florida Supreme Court, but relief
was denied on the ground that the federal constitutional right to counsel
extended only to trials for non-petty offenses punishable by more than six
months imprisonment. 8 The United States Supreme Court reversed this
decision, holding that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,9 no person
may be imprisoned for any offense, felony or misdemeanor, unless he has
been represented by counsel at his trial.
The right of an indigent to court-appointed counsel, gradually extended
by the Court,' was first extended only to those persons charged with capital
offenses." Subsequently, the Court established the "special circumstances
rule," 12 extending the right to those charged with felonies only if the special
circumstances of the case, such as the complexity of the defense, required
that counsel be appointed to insure a fair trial.'8 Later, however, the Su-
Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 219 (1962);
Krnisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The
Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 1 (1962);'The Right to Coun-
sel: A Symposium, 45 MINN. L. REv. 693 (1961).
For a discussion of the historical background of the right to counsel controversy see
Heidelbaugh & Becker, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases-an Inquiry into the
History and Practice in England and America, 28 Nonm" D)Ami L. Rav. 351 (1953);
-eidelbauh & Becker, Blackstone's Use of Medieval Law in Criminal Cases Involving
benefit of Counsel, 7 MAMI L. Q. 184 (1953).
6 407 U.S.25 {1972).
6 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970).
7F.S.A. § 790.01 (1965).
gThe Florida Supreme Court, in ruling on the right to counsel, followed the Court's
decision in Duncan r. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
9 For a comprehensive examination of the requisites of an effective waiver of the right
to counsel, see Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1960).
1o Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH L. REv. 685 (1967).
11 See Powell v. Alabama, 287,. U.S. 45 (1932). The defendants were charged with
rape. Although the trial judge appointed the entire Scottsboro bar to defend them, no
attorney was specifically assigned to their defense, and this was held to be violative
"9f the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
12 See Betts v. Brady, 316 US. 455 (1942).
,13 The Court's reluctance to extend the right to counsel beyond certain felonies was
apparent:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of
one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and
RECENT DECISIONS '
preme Court, in the landmark case of Gideon v. Wain'wrigbt,'4 rejected the
"special circumstances" standard and extended the right to court-appointed
counsel to all indigent defendants charged with felonies. 5
Strictly interpreted, Gideon applies only to those persons charged with
a felony.16 The possibility of its application to misdemeanor cases was left
open by the general language in the opinion,17 and as a result, many conflict-
ing decisions arose in state courts as to whether Gideon should be so ex-
tended.' 8  A minority of states refuse appointed counsel to any person
charged with a misdemeanor; 19 others provide counsel in the more serious
right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction
lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the Amendment em-
bodies an inexorable command that no trial foi any offense, or in any court, can
be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by
counsel. Id. at 473.
14 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15 The defendant, who refused appointed counsel, received a five year prison sentence
for breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, which is a felony in
Florida. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment made binding on the states the
sixth amendment's right to counsel, which is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial."
Id. at 342.
16 See note 15 supra.
1' In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan said:
The special circumstances rule has been f6rmally abandoned in capital cases, and
the time has now come when it should be similarly abandoned in noncapital cases;
at least as to offenses which, as the one involved here, carry the possibility of a
substantial prison sentence. (Whether the rule should be extended to all criminal
cases need not now be decided.)
372 US. at 351.
18 Compare Watkins v. Morris, 179 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1965); State v. Brown, 250 La.
1023, 201 So. 2d 277 (1967); and Toledo v. Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 226 N.E2d
777 (1967), 'with Bolkovac v. State, 229 Id. 294, 98 NE.2d 250 (1951) and State v. Borst,
278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967).
The Court has denied certiorari in three cases arising after Gideon but before Ar-
gersinger, which specifically raised the issue of the right to court-appointed counsel for
one charged with a misdemeanor. Many courts have interpreted its refusal as a further
indication that Gideon was intended to apply only to felony cases. See Winters v.
Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966); Hendrix
v. Seattle, 76 Wash. 2d 142, 456 P.2d 696 (1969).
19 Virginia is among the minority of states that restrict this right to felony cases.
The legislature has extended the right to court-appointed counsel to persons questioned
concerning a felony, to those being tried for a felony, to those effecting an appeal for
a felony conviction, and to juveniles during confinement hearings in state juvenile courts.
See VA. CODE ANNi. § 19.1-241.1 (Cum. Supp. 1972). See also Dailey v. Commonwealth,
208 Va. 452, 158 S.E.2d 731 (1968); Durhan v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 452, 158 S.E.2d
135 (1967); Thacker v. Peyton, 206 Va. 771, 146 S.E.2d 176 (1966); Cabaniss v. Cunning-
ham, 206 Va. 330, 143 S.E.2d 911 (1965); Fitzgerald v. Smyth, 194 Va. 681, 74 SE.2d
8I0 (1953); Watlins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 518, 6 S.E.2d 670 (1940).
The issue of the right to court-appointed counsel for misdemeanants has not been
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misdemeanor cases;20 still other states have even extended the right to court-
appointed counsel to persons charged with any crime that could possibly
result in loss of liberty.21
The Supreme Court of Virginia has declared the right to counsel to be a
fundamental right within the Virginia Bill of Rights.22 Thus, if a person
charged with a felony proceeds in forma pauperis, the court must appoint
counsel to act in his defense23 By statute, the right to appointed counsel is
specifically extended to those charged with a felony.24 Adopted three years
after Gideon, the statute indicates that the legislature interpreted Gideon as
extending the right to court-appointed counsel only to those charged with
felonies. 25
A wide divergence exists in the practice of state and federal courts con-
cerning the extent of the indigent's right to counsel.26 Under existing
statutes27 and rules of procedure, 28 the federal courts guarantee the right
to court-appointed counsel to any person charged with a crime, whether
felony or misdemeanor. Thus, anyone facing a charge for which the pun-
ishment exceeds six months imprisonment and a five hundred dollar fine has
raised in any reported cases in Virginia. See Manson, The Indigent in Virginia, 51 VA.
L. REv. 163 (1965).2oSee People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213 N.E.2d 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1965);
People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d 358, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1965). In Maryland
counsel must be appointed when the offense is one "for which the maximum punish-
ment is . . . imprisonment for a period of six months or more," and may be assigned
in cases involving lesser penalties. See Manning v. State, 237 Md. 349, 206 A.2d 563
(1965); MD. R. P. 719(b) (2) (Supp. 1967).
21 CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42
Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965). Resting its decision on the state constitutional guarantee of the
right to counsel, the court found the right ". . not limited to felony cases but ...
eqialy guaranteed to persons charged with misdemeanors in a municipal or other in-
ferior court." Id. at -, 398 P.2d at 422, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
For a survey of the right to court-appointed counsel as applied by each state, see
generally Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REv. 685
(1967).
221n Barnes v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794, 23 S.. 784 (1895), the Virginia Constitu-
tion was interpreted as guaranteeing the right to counsel in felony trials. VA. CoNsT.
art. I, § 8 (1902). See note 19 supra.
2 3 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-241.3 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
24 See note 19 supra.
25 Adopted in 1948, the statute was reworded by the Virginia Legislature in 1966 with
no indication of extending the right to counsel to misdemeanor cases.
26Compare James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969); Colon v. Hendry, 408
F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1969); and Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965), with
Watkins v. Morris, 179 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1965).
27 Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1970).
28 FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a). Rule 44(a) provides that if the defendant appears in court
without counsel, the court must advise him of his rights in this respect and assign coun-
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the right to a court-appointed attorney.m However, as has been noted, many
state courts, citing Gideon, extend this right only to persons charged with
felonies.80 Therefore, in many state courts an indigent charged with a mis-
demeanor is not guaranteed the same due process rights as an indigent
charged with a misdemeanor in a federal court.
In Argersinger v. Hamlin3l the Court has established the extent of the
indigent's right to court-appointed counsel.32 An indigents right to coun-
sel is no longer determined by the category in which the alleged criminal
offense is placed.83 The Court recognizes that the sixth amendment provides
specified standards for all criminal prosecutions. 34 Since the right to a
public trial and the right to confrontation have not been limited to felony
cases, there is no reason why the right to counsel should be so limited. Thus,
the right to counsel exists in every case in which an accused is deprived of
his liberty upon conviction, and the denial of the assistance of counsel will
preclude the imposition of a jail sentence by a state or federal court.
The term "imprisonment" is most often used to connote imprisonment
in law. So used, the Court's decision would apparently suggest that if a law
allows the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment on conviction of the
offense charged, the indigent defendant may rightfully invoke his right to
sel to represent him at every stage of the proceedings unless the defendant elects to
proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel. See also Von Moltke v. Gilie,
332 U.S. 708 (1948) and Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947).
29 See 18 US.C. § 1 (1970).30 Junker, supra note 21, at 722.
31 407 US. 25 (1972).
32 The Argersinger Court quoted the Supreme Court of Oregon to express its view.
In re Stevenson, 254 Or. 94, 458 P.2d 414 (1969):
[N]o person may be deprived of his liberty who has been denied the assistance
of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. This holding is applicable to
all criminal prosecutions, including prosecutions for violations of municipal or-
dinances. The denial of the assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition
of a jail sentence. Id. at -, 458 P.2d at 418.3 3 Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority of the Court, ended the confusion
and controversy caused by the language in Gideon. See note 17 supra. He argued that
Gideon was not meant to limit the right to counsel to felony trials only. "The case
involved a felony but its rationale has relevance to any criminal trial where an accused
is deprived of his liberty." 407 U.S. at 32.
34 Although clarifying Gideon, the Argersinger Court liberally quoted from that
decision:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very be-
ginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphisis
on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before im-
partial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This
noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man. charged with crime has to face
his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. 372 U.S. at 344.
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counsel.3 5 However, the majority opinion discusses imprisonment in a fac-
tual rather than legal context.386 As a practical matter, imprisonment is rarely
if ever imposed for certain misdemeanors carrying such a punishment.31 The
Court is concerned with proceedings that, as a matter of fact, put the indi-
gent defendant's liberty in jeopardy. Argersinger calls for the appointment
of counsel in those classes of cases in which, in the event of conviction, there
is some likelihood of imprisonment. The right to counsel extends to all
offenses for which incarceration as a punishment is a practical possibility.38
This is a narrower approach than the term "imprisonment" would at first
suggest.8 9
The reasoning behind the majority opinion runs to the very heart of our
system of criminal justice, i.e., one's absolute and unquestioned right to a
fair trial. The assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the existence of a
fair trial. 40 In addition, the volume of misdemeanor cases often creates an
obsession for speedy dispositions that results in assembly line justice where
the accused is treated not as an individual but as a number on a docket 41
Clearly, such treatment has a prejudicial effect on the defense. Difficult
legal questions, taxing to a legally trained mind not to mention that of an
indigent defendant, often arise in trials for petty offenses.42 In such cir-
cumstances, the right to be heard would be of little avail if it did not include
the right to be heard by counsel.43
A possible explanation for the hesitancy of the courts in finding a right
to appointed counsel for indigent defendants in misdemeanor cases lies in
35 The California Supreme Court suggested this approach in In re Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d
634, 427 P.2d 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967): "[TIhere can be no doubt that the funda-
mental right to the assistance of counsel (extends) to all persons charged with a mis-
demeanor in a justice or other inferior court." Id. at -, 427 P.2d at 184, 58 Cal. Rptr.
at 584.
36 407 US. at 39. The Court quotes from the American Bar Association project on
Standards for Criminal Justice.
3 7 Id. at 38 n. 10.
38 Id. at 39.
39 See note 38 supra.
40 See note 3 supra.
41407 U.S. at 34 n. 4. See also 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSES OF THm POOR IN THm Cvim-
INAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 123 (1965); Report of the Conference on Legal
Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D. 389 (1966). In Junker, The Right to
Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REv. 685 (1967), the author referred to
misdemeanor prosecutions as the "Appalachia" of the criminal justice system.
42 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
43 The Argersinger Court also framed the rationale for its decision within a social con-
text. Imprisonment, however short, is seldom viewed by the accused as a trivial matter,
and often results in the loss of employment and reputation. Such consequences demand
the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment. 407 US. at 37.
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the fear that too great a burden will be placed on the effective administra-
tion of criminal proceedings.& " A burden has no doubt been placed on the
profession as a result of the Argersinger decision,45 but in a balancing
process this should not receive disproportionate weight. For, in a trial, the
prosecution is able to marshal all the forces of the state against the de-
fendant, who must overcome the prosecution's advantages of money, edu-
cation, and experience. In such an uneven match, basic considerations of
fairness require that the defendant in misdemeanor cases receive aid from
one who has a working knowledge of the procedures and processes involved.
In many classes of misdemeanors, non-indigent defendants refrain from
securing counsel.46 Argersinger gives the indigent defendant the right to
make this choice when his freedom is in jeopardy.
Two of the justices believe that the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases
should not be made absolute under all circumstances, but should be deter-
mined by the trial court's exercise of judicial discretion on a case-by-case
basis. 47 The court's reasons for not requiring counsel would then be stated
so that the issue could be pursued for review. However, this line of rea-
soning engenders the belief that, while other constitutional rights might be
available to criminal defendants generally, the right to appointed counsel
should be granted only sparingly in cases of unarguable necessity. However,
the sixth amendment gives no basis for any distinction between the right
to counsel and the other rights therein.
The rule adopted in Argersinger does not go as far as it might appear;
it is limited to cases in which the sentence is imprisonment. Such an arbi-
trary guideline is more easily described than justified. The demand for re-
liability and fairness to which the right to counsel responds exists as well
in cases that do not jeopardize the accused's liberty as in those that do.
44 Mr. Justice Powell gave voice to this fear in his separate opinion. Id. at 56-60. See
Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-
Policy Observations, 48 MiN. L. REv. 1, 68 (1963).
4 5 Mr. Chief Justice Burger believed that the legal profession is willing and capable -
of meeting this challenge of rising to the burdens placed upon it. 407 US. at 44.
Justice Brennen expressed the view that law students could be called upon to provide,
an additional source of legal representation for the indigent through clinical programs
in which faculty supervised students aid clients in legal matters. id. at 40.
The time has come for the enactment of a law that allows third-year law students, in.
clinical programs established by students and faculty, to represent indigent defendants-
in the community surrounding the school of law.
4 0 In Seattle it was found that persons charged with speeding, and driving without-
a license hired counsel in only about 6.5 percent of the sample cases. Junker, The Right-
to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WAsH. L. REv. 685, 713 (1967); Junker, Report on-
the Need for Publicly Provided Counsel in King County, Appendix D (1965) (unpub-
lished, on file at the University of Washington and Harvard law libraries).
47 407 US. 25 (1972) (Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring).
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The direction in which the court has moved in Argersinger does not nec-
essarily foreshadow the eventual adoption of such a rule. It seems impos-
sible to ignore responsibly the extraordinary demands on the legal system
that a wider application of the right to counsel than that declared in Arger-
singer would impose.48 Justice is not advanced by promising more than it
can deliver. The sixth and fourteenth amendments require the right to coun-
sel for any person "charged with crime," and that the indigent defendant
enjoy the same rights, as nearly as is practicable, as are enjoyed by persons
who are able to afford the retention of counsel. In the past, this requirement
has not been met. But the standards set forth in Argersinger more nearly
and realistically meet these requirements than has any previous interpreta-
tion of the sixth amendment guarantee.
G. L. C.
48 See 1 L. SILVERSmEIN, DEFENSES OF TE PooR in the CMnmiAL CASES IN AMERICAN
STATE COURTS 123; Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Crhninal
Law, 41 F.R.D. 389 (1966).
